The proliferation of networking technologies in commercial, consumer, and industrial applications has been mirrored in the defense industry. The US Department of Defense, along with comparable organizations abroad, have adopted a network centric paradigm for emerging and future systems. This migration to an information based approach is akin to the move to Just-In-Time manufacturing. That is, both approaches seek to achieve synergies from Information rather than from bulk of material. In the JIT case, this material is the component parts or materials, and in the military SoS the material may be armor and/or ammunition. Specifically, the US military is attempting to leverage the synergies of net centricity in order to obtain a more mobile and lighter fighting fleet that retains the same lethality and survivability by shedding armor and ammo in favor of information (radios and computers). In previous years, this author has presented papers on network reliability [1] and multi-state reliability [2] to the RAMS. In this year's paper, the notion of multi-state reliability is combined with the ad-hoc network reliability methods. This integrated model provides the ability to measure, in capacity terms the reliability of a SoS level by considering the network's state (connectivity) temporally and the interactions and contributions of its elements. Specifically, this paper describes a mathematical construct for simulating the capacity of general functions including lethality, mobility, survivability, reconnaissance, and supportability based upon traditional probabilistic measures of reliability. Next, the paper will describe a new method to combine those platform capabilities to an aggregate SoS level capability that is dependent on the connectivity between those nodes and the resultant synergies realized due to said connectivity.
INTRODUCTION
Few complex systems have binomial failure modes, meaning, simplifying the possible system states to operating and failed is inappropriate for most multi-mode, multifunction systems. Items such as light bulbs fit the binomial model, most other things have multiple failure modes which individually may be binomial, multinomial or continuous in their failure effects. This is also true of a Systems of Systems (SoS) which can take on multiple degraded states between the fully operational and fully failed extremes.
However, reliability requirements and their associated assessment models often lack the necessary fidelity to adequately account for this multi-state reality.
The Army's acquisition policies mandate that a reliability/availability requirement be included as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) for all systems and System of Systems (SoS). The traditional metrics for these systems, usually use terms such as System Abort (SA), Essential Function Failure (EFF), and Non-Essential Function Failure (NEFF) as reliability failure classifications. The requirement metric is then a mean time or probability associated with each failure severity. A system abort is the most severe type of failure and it results in a system being "down" or in a nonoperational, non-mission capable state. Thus, operational availability (Ao) is a function of the frequency of failures in this class. However, the use of such metrics reverts to a binomial state with respect to each severity. To better understand the reliability and associated performance the use of capacity based models is preferred. Such models can also be simplified to provide numbers based upon the binomial models by setting capacity thresholds.
Similarly, it is desirable to communicate the reliability of a SoS by describing its ability to deliver a certain level of one or more functional capabilities over a mission's duration. One may also provide the expected value of functional capacity using the same method. To this end, binomial, multinomial, and continuous failure modeling is combined with graph theory based network reliability methods. Each platform's reliability model is developed based upon the type of failure mode and its probability (or frequency) of occurrence. The residual capability of each platform is then aggregated depending on each platforms connectivity to the network of the SoS.
RELATED WORK

Multi-state Reliability
Reliability apportionment is a classic methodology in the Reliability Engineering Body of Knowledge and the subject of much research in the literature. The existence of multi-state reliability measures for systems and components provides further subtleties for research extensions. The Reliability Allocation Problem (RAP) can take several forms but the ultimate goal is system architecture and a component reliability requirement set that meet the system's top level reliability.
Ramirez-Marquez and Coit [3] delivered a heuristic which is applied to the redundancy allocation problem when it can be formulated with a reliability constraint and a cost objective function (optimized to be minimal) for multi-state systems with binomial component failures. In the areas of networks, Ramirez-Marquez and Coit [4] introduce the use of Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate a multi-state network, developing an efficient and accurate approach to approximate the Multi-state Two-terminal Reliability (M2TR).
Additionally, this author has presented an approach for the RAP in a multi-state case to RAMS 2008 [2] .
Ad-hoc Network Reliability
Cook and Ramirez-Marquez [1] and [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have developed methods for the analysis of ad-hoc network reliability. These address the unique nature of ad-hoc networks which have no fixed infrastructure and as such take on a dynamic nature with respect to the reliability wise system description. These publications include methods for terminal reliability in a binomial case [1] , [5] , and [6] , where the network and its nodes are either operational or not. A later extension of this work addresses a capacity based method [7] . While most recent papers look to solve the same problems for the analysis of multi-tier network reliability [8] [9] and multitier network optimization [10] .
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In a System of Systems, each system may be referred to as a node and these are indexed by i=1,2,…n. When each of these systems has multiple functions the functions are indexed by j=1,2,…k. In this treatment, it is considered that platforms have the same set of functions, making k a constant for all values of i. When a function is fully available for a platform it is at full capacity. When a function is completely failed it is at zero capacity. A degraded state indicates a capacity between fully operational and completely failed.
Thus, if the j th function on the i th platform is fully operational let c ij = 1.0. When that same function is lost c ij = 0 and when it is degraded; 0 < c ij < 1.0.
The actual values that c ij may take on when in a degraded mode depends on the nature of the system, its failure modes, and the effects on system functionality imparted by the failure modes.
To that end, three classifications of failure modes and resultant functional states are considered. First, the binomial case where c ij = 1.0 or 0 and never otherwise. Second, the still discrete but multinomial case where there are a finite number of degraded states where c ij may take on a finite number of values between zero and one. This is what is often referred to as multistate in the reliability literature. Third, is a continuous state where c ij may take on any value between zero and one.
As examples, consider those provided in Table 1 . For the binomial case, reliability takes on the traditional definition as the probability that the item is operational over a given time, t, see Equation 1 . Although the failure probability may take on any distribution, the Exponential and Weibull are the most often used in reliability analyses, see Equation 2 and 3; respectively. To simulate the binomial failure case, a random number generation based approach is used which compares a test variable to the probability of failure during the interval simulated to determine if/when a failure arrives. The approach can use any probability distribution; however the examples that follow will be limited to Exponential and Weibull.
For the multinomial case a Markov model may be used to describe the multiple states and transition rates or probabilities between them.
If the failure rates are exponentially distributed then the Markov model holds mathematically. In either case the graphical representation of the Markov model is illustrative to defining this system failure type. See Figure 1 for an example of a basic multinomial system with 3 states.
Continuing discussion of the multinomial case, let the number of states be represented by s. Where Figure 1 represents a functional failure scenario with s = 3. The number of transitions and thus the number of unique failure rates is represented by, given by λ*.
To simulate the multinomial case, the procedure below is used. Again, failure rates and probabilities used may be modified to suit the expect failure distribution of the failure modes studied. Here it is necessary to define a metric, state(t).
This
to translate state to capacity. The matrix z, provides the capacity that is achieved in a given state. Thus, if state(t) = x (a integer between 1 and s) then the element of z, z xj is the capacity associated with that state of function j. Then if state ij (t) = 3 and z 3j = 0.5 then c ij (t) = 0.5. Accordingly, failure rates must be assigned for each possible state transition. If there are s states and λ* transitions, then there must be λ* unique failure rates. A system may fail such that it transitions to any state of a lower capacity; that is failure can not improve performance. Thus, the failure rates are mapped to states by creating a square matrix of size s, given by λ where element λ mn is the failure rate associated with transition from state m to n, when m > n, λ mn = 0. If it is possible for the system to fail from state m to n then, λ mn > 0. It should be noted, that based upon the procedure, multiple failures from a state m to various states of lower capacity (denoted as n) may be predicted in a given time interval. If this is the case, then by procedure, the resultant state at the next interval will be the state associated with the lowest capacity. This is intentional and follows a weakest link type axiom. For the binomial case, the above procedure is used where s=2.
In the continuous case, the failed and functional states take on the same meaning mathematically and practically, however there are infinite intermediate states and c ij can take on any value between zero and one. There is no limitation on the functions which may govern such a case. The degradation rate can follow a linear, logarithmic or power function. For the purposes of this paper, a monotonically decreasing capacity is assumed and modeled by considering a standard linear model with a variable slope. Specifically, the slope will be stochastically modeled using a slope that varies randomly over time by considering a uniform distribution of slope constrained between a maximum degradation rate and zero. The process for simulating that degradation in increments of Δt is given below. It is important to note, in the above construct m max is defined as a positive value but equates to a negative slope. The procedure may be modified to include non-linear degradations as appropriate for unique failure modes. Simulation Procedure for Continuous case c ij (t=0) = 1
To apply this approach to the SoS an aggregation of platform capacities must be performed.
That is, to demonstrate the normalized capacity of the whole by considering the capacities of the pieces. To do so, one method is to average the capacity amongst the nodes (platforms), this is accomplished using Equation 5 , where C j is the aggregated capacity achieved by the SoS and a function of c ij  for each value of j. However, in reality assuming all nodes contribute to the whole regardless of their membership and connectivity to the network is optimistic if not flawed. It is more appropriate to realize the functional capacity of the whole (the SoS) is not only a function of the capacities of the parts (the platforms) but of the interactions of those platforms via the network. Consider that a platform disconnected from the rest of the SoS may have reconnaissance capacity in that its sensor package is functional, however, if the platform is disconnected from the network that capacity may not be shared amongst its peers. Therefore, its value is diminished or eliminated with respect to the capability of the SoS.
It is unfair, however to say that all functional capacity may only be credited if a node is connected. Therefore one must consider each function type individually and determine the level of dependence or independence that functionality has from network connectivity state. For illustrative purposes, Table 2 provides a discussion of 5 functional types and the relative dependency on network connectivity.
A de-rating adjustment factor will be established for each function based upon this dependency to network connectivity. The capacity of a function will be multiplied by this factor if disconnected before being aggregated. After adjustment the residual is referred to as penalized capacity and denoted as: (6) That is, if the ability of a function to contribute to the
whole is completely independent of a network connection the adjustment factor will be 1.0, if it is completely dependent that this adjustment factor will be equal to 0. Otherwise, a value between zero and one will be used. Therefore, using the The results of such a simulation for a single platform of this type are provided in Figure 2 . When the results are aggregated, across the 18 node network the resultant capacities are shown in Figure 3 .
The reader will note that the aggregation induces additional steps in the multi-nominal functional failure modes and a smoothing effect on the continuous modes. This is as expected as taking the product of these stochastic approaches will tend to have an averaging effect where the capacity of the a SoS will tend toward the Expected Value of capacity for an individual platform as n approaches infinity assuming a highly reliable network. If the network is unreliable this value will approach the product of the EV and the de-rating factor. The de-rating factors for this problem are given in Table 2 . Survivability Platforms armor and active protection will be unaffected by network connectivity but the probability of encountering and enemy will be increased as warnings from others will not be received when communications is lost 0.5
Mobility Platform ability to maneuver will be largely unaffected, however, in some cases the best routes will not be chosen because warnings of obstacles ahead may not be received
Recon This function is impacted the most as the purpose of a reconnaissance function is to distribute information.
0.25
Logistics This function, representing a platforms ability to support and sustain itself will be impacted to the extent the platform is not-self sufficient and relies on communications to call for resources as compared to using onboard spares and replenishment 0.5
It is important to note the network simulated had a link reliability of 0.7, this is the probability of a link between platform i and j is 0.7, or as denoted in [1] , P(l ij = 1) = 0.7. The results of the analysis are intuitively dependent upon the reliability characteristics of the network as well as the reliability (failure) parameters which describe the systems modes of failure or performance degradation. This example has been presented to describe the method and the outputs it provides.
RESULTS
For a SoS the reliability of each element is important but the capability of the whole is paramount. The method presented provides the ability to determine the resultant capability of a SoS subject to imperfect constituent systems which demonstrate failure modes of the binomial, multinomial, or continuous variety. Additionally, the method provides the analyst the ability to consider functional interactions and the reliance on the network to enable certain capabilities. That is, the reliability (or connectivity) of the network relative to each node is consider when determining its contribution to the capability of the whole; to the SoS.
